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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONFIDENTIAL PLEA OF GUILTY RENDERED IN
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, ON THE 6th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1997, BEFORE THE HONORABLE
RAY M. HARDING, SR., RESERVING THE ISSUE OF SUPPRESSION FOR
APPELLATE REVIEW WHERE THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED DEFENDANT'S
SUPPRESSION MOTION.
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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court
of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the lower Court count error in denying Defendant's Motion to

Suppress and/or Dismiss based upon the non-consensual search of the trunk of
Defendant's vehicle which resulted in finding illegal drugs.
1

The Standard of Review.

In reviewing whether probable cause existed

allowing the police office to conduct a non-consensual search of the trunk of
defendant's vehicle, the standard in reviewing the lower court's factual findings is
under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d.851 (Utah, 1992);
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d.l229 (Utah, 1996). The standard of review for the trial
court's conclusions of law is under the correctness standard. State v. Yoder, 935
P.2d.534 (Utah App. 1997): State v. Pena, 869 P.2d. 932 (Utah, 1994).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTION, AND PROVISIONS,
STATUES AND RULES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules which are
determinative of the issues presented in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty consented to by prosecution
and accepted by the Court preserving for appellate review the legal issues surrounding
the detention and search upon which the case legally hinges.
The Defendant was sentenced on January 13, 1998, to serve an indeterminate
term not to exceed five (5) years with the sentence suspended upon successful
completion of probation and all terms thereof.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant, Christopher Wright, was stopped by Sergeant Paul Mangelson
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of the Utah Highway Patrol on 1-15 at the middle-Nephi off ramp because he was
driving like a person who was either sleepy or intoxicated (Tr. 6). Officer Mangelson,
in describing his driving pattern indicated the vehicle was weaving in the traffic lane
and crossed over the divider line more than twice and also noticed that the front plate
of the vehicle was bouncing around and a check on the plates showed that it was "not
on file" (Tr. 6,7).
Upon approaching the stopped vehicle of the Defendant, Officer Mangelson
requested the license and registration and Defendant produced his drivers license and
a copy of the rental agreement for the rental car and said rental agreement indicated
it was for the same type of vehicle, year and model as the one being operated by the
Defendant (Tr-19).
Officer Mangelson also testified that as he was talking to the Defendant he
noticed a motel brochure and an airplane ticket on the rear floor boards and saw on
the front floor boards a brand new duffel bag, a cell phone, and a road map. (Tr-6).
The officer further testified he suspected drug activity because of the fact that
Defendant had gone to Tucson which the Trooper described in testifying as "probably
the drug capital of the United States", the fact the defendant had rented a car there,
and had in his possession a new duffel bag, a cell phone, a road atlas, and concluded
defendant's statement that he had gone to Arizona to buy a boat which didn't work
out didn't add up . (Tr. 8-9)
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Officer Mangelson then testified as follows:
A:
...and as I talked to him a little longer the odor of
marijuana was about the vehicle, or on him.
Q:
Is that an odor you smelled immediately or one that
came.
A:
I didn't smell it when I initially walked up to the car.
But as I was around him a little more, I could smell it. It
was an obvious odor. Eventually I asked him about that.
He denied any usage of it. And at that point I asked if I
could search the vehicle. (Tr-9).
After the Defendant denied permission to search the vehicle, Officer
Mangelson indicated he was going to search the vehicle. (Tr-12), and ordered the
Defendant out of the vehicle and to open the trunk (Tr-13).
That Officer Mangelson testified he made no effort to search the interior of the
vehicle prior to ordering the Defendant to open the trunk of the vehicle (Tr-25).
Officer Mangelson also testified that after ordering the Defendant to exit his
vehicle, he did a quick pat down search on his person and didn't find anything on his
person prior to directing the Defendant to open the trunk. (Tr-26).
At the time Officer Mangelson ordered the defendant to open the trunk, he
had found no drugs or paraphernalia and had made no search of the passenger
compartment of the vehicle but thought the items he found in the vehicle including
the atlas, plane ticket, duffel bag, were consistent with drug usage. (Tr-26-27).
The trial Court issued a memorandum decision dated July 7, 1997, denying
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress such evidence (R.38-40),
4

resulting in the defendant entering a conditional plea reserving the search issue for
appellate determination.
SUMMARY

QF ARGUMENT
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automobile was without probable cause and in violation of Defendant's federal and
state constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
; :. Defendant, Christopher \ Vriglit, also asserts tl lere was i tot probable cause
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trunk was not incident to an arrest and was therefore not permissible.
ARGUMENT
I.
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR IN
DETERMINING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE TO
SEARCH EXISTED.
Officer Mangelson testified he executed a traffic stop by ;
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times and seeing a license plate that was shaking, apparently loose, and such facts
were accepted by the trial court (R.39-40) and Defendant recognizes this Court's
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Defendant will not assert clear error with regard to the underlying factual findings
made by the trial court.
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The Defendant/Appellant does request and assert the trial Court's conclusions
of law based upon those factual findings are incorrect and reviewable for correctness.
State v, Yoder 935 P2d. 534 (Utah App. 1997).
In State v. Maycock 947 P2d. 695 (Utah App. 1997), The Utah Court of
Appeals addressed as a matter of first impression probable cause to support a search
of a vehicle based solely on the officer's subjective belief that he smelled marijuana
and ruled a search would only be upheld if the search corroborates marijuana or it's
use.
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Maycock, cited supra, agreed with the
reasoning of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Nielsen 9 F 3d.
1487 (T Th. Cir 1993). In the United States v. Nielsen, cited supra, Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled the search of the trunk of the vehicle was without probable
cause where a consensual search of the passenger compartment had revealed no
marijuana nor any related contraband.
In the instance preceding, Officer Mangelson indicated as he was talking to the
Defendant, "the odor of marijuana was about the vehicle or on him" (Tr. 9) which is
very similar to State v.Maycock, cited supra, where the Utah Courtof Appeals excised
the following from United States v. Nielsen, cited supra,:
"As he talked to the Defendant, the trooper said he
smelled burnt marijuana coming from the open
window of the Defendant's vehicle. See id. When
asked, the Defendant denied having marijuana in the
6

vehicle and consented to a search. See id. The trooper
found nothing suggesting marijuana use;
notwithstanding, the trooper persisted, and over the
Defendant's objections searched the trunk of the
vehicle.
*

\i

*

Hi

the Defendant

and making inquiry as to marijuana, stated as follows:
"I didn't smell it when I initially walked up to the car. But
as I was around him a little more I could smell it. It was an
obvious odor. Eventually I asked him about that. He
denied any usage of it. And at that point I asked if I coiild
search the vehicle"
Officer Mangelson made no attempt to search the passenger compartment for
marijuana or paraphernalia and immediately after Defendant refused to allow a

finding nothing to corroborate marijuana or its use.
Under the reasoning and rationale in State v. Maycock,cited supra, a
warrantless search ;,•: t:u Defendant s perse
he • * •: '*,-.:•••'-
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• marijuana emanating from the Defendant or

around him. There was no attempt to corroborate the subjective odor of marijuana
1:>)< the officer as evidenced by virtue of tl ic fact he didn't conduct a searcl

lie

defendant. There
was never any suggestion or testimony by Officer Mangelson that the odor was
emanating from anywhere but on him or around him and no testimony the odor was
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emanating from the trunk or the trunk area.
A search of the interior passenger compartment would not have produced any
evidence of drugs or paraphanelia in that neither were found when the inventory of
the vehicle was made after the drugs had been found in the trunk and the Defendant
had been arrested (Tr-28).
Consequently, Defendant asserts the search of the trunk of Defendant's vehicle
was impermissible and unsupported by probable cause for the search was limited as
provided in State v. Maycock cited supra.
II.
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR IN
FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE THAT A CRIME WAS
BEING COMMITTED.
The trial court in rendering it's memorandum decision declared a reasonable
suspicion if not probable cause that a crime existed at the time Officer Mangelson
ordered the defendant to exit his vehicle by virtue of Officer Mangelson offering
testimony that he had observed a motel brochure, a plane ticket, a new duffel bag, a
road atlas, a cell phone, and was driving from Tucson and defendant was not able to
substantiate his story about going to buy a boat. (R-39).
While the Defendant asserts there was not probable cause to arrest for a
criminal violation, the search of the trunk is not justified as a search incident to arrest
as pronounced in New York v. Delton 453 US 454 (1981).

8

The United States Supreme Court ruling in Belton was addressed by the Utah
Court of Appeals in State v. Spurgeon, 904 P2d. 220 (Utah App. 1995) where the
court stated Spurgeon's case closely resembled New York v. Delton, cited supra, and
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Obviously once the Defendant was arrested the existence of exigent
circumstances no longer existed and therefore a search of the trunk as incident to
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In Spurgeon, cited supra, the finding of contraband in the vehicle provided
additional probable cause to search the trunk of their vehicle, such additional
probable cause not being present in the instant case for Officer Mangelson patted
<li H v i i 11 if" I in "I el i d in ni I In mi! i ::l

.-.

V' )

compartment or any containers in the passenger compartment to justify continuation
of the search into the vehicle's trunk.
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defendant's arrest and was not supported by probable cause rendering the decision of
the trial court erroneous.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above and foregoing arguments the Defendant Christopher
Wright requests this Court reverse the trial Court's decision regarding Defendant's
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Motion to Suppress Evidence determining that the evidence obtained was obtained as
a result of an unreasonable search in violation of defendant's constitutional rights.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/J

day of May, 1998.

RONALD W. PERKINS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct coy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to the plaintiff/respondent's attorney, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Attorney for the Respondent, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84114,
on this

/J

day of May, 1998.

RONALD W. PERKINS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

10

APPENDIX "A"
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 961400124
DATE: July 3, 1997

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
CHRISTOPHER DAVID WRIGHT,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or
Suppress. Having received and considered the Motion, together with a memorandum in
support of the Motion, the Court hereby denies the Motion and delivers the following
Memorandum Decision.
Statement of Facts
On September 5, 1996, Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol
observed a vehicle, driven by the Defendant, weaving across the lane divider at least two
times and saw that the license plate was shaking, apparently loose. A check on the license
plate number returned the information "not on file." Based on these violations and
observations, Sergeant Mangelson executed a traffic stop of the Defendant's vehicle.
Sergeant Mangelson approached the vehicle and asked the Defendant for his driver's
license and registration. The Defendant produced a valid driver's license and a car rental
agreement. As Sergeant Mangelson was at the driver's door, he observed a new duffel bag,
road atlas, and cell phone on the front floorboard as well as a motel brochure and airplane
ticket on the rear floorboard of the vehicle.
The Defendant told Sergeant Mangelson that he was driving back from Tucson,
where he had gone to buy a boat, but the deal had fallen through. About this time, Sergeant
11

Mangelson detected the odor of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. Sergeant
Mangelson asked the Defendant for permission to search the vehicle for marijuana, but the
Defendant refused permission to search. Sergeant Mangelson then told the Defendant to exit
the vehicle, did a pat down search of the Defendant, ordered the Defendant to open the trunk
of the vehicle, and found a duffle bag containing 25 lbs. of marijuana. The Defendant was
subsequently arrested and charged with Illegal Possession/Use of Controlled Substance,
Failure to Pay/Affix Drug Tax, and Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

Opinion of the Court
The Court finds that Sergeant Mangelson was justified in his initial stop of the
Defendant. It is a well-settled point of law that an officer may stop and detain an individual
who has committed a traffic violation in the officer's presence. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Weaving between lanes on the freeway and failing to properly secure
the license plate justified Sergeant Mangelson's stop of the Defendant.
Once the objective for the initial stop was completed, Sergeant Mangelson needed
probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of a crime to continue detention of
the Defendant and conduct a search of the vehicle without a warrant or consent. Colorado v.
Bannister. 449 U.S. 1 (1980).
Probable cause is established when an officer, viewing the totality of the
circumstances in light of his experience, comes to a reasonable belief that criminal conduct is
afoot. State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534-35 (Utah 1994). In this case, Sergeant Mangelson
observed the motel brochure, plane ticket, new duffel bag, road atlas, and cell phone, which
alone would not indicate criminal activity. In addition, however, the Defendant was driving
back from Tucson, a city well known as a hub for marijuana smuggling and was not able to
substantiate in any way his story about going to buy a boat. These facts when viewed in light
of Sergeant Mangelson's training and experience are sufficient for Sergeant Mangelson to
have a reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause that a crime was being committed.
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More importantly, and dispositive of this issue, is the fact that Sergeant Mangelson
smelled marijuana while speaking with the Defendant at the vehicle. This fact, along with
previously outlined facts, were sufficient to form a valid basis for probable cause to believe
the Defendant was involved in criminal activity and that the vehicle contained evidence of a
crime. Under the automobile exception, Sergeant Mangelson's search of the vehicle's trunk
was valid. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
Additionally, the plain smell doctrine states that evidence may be seized without a
warrant when the police officer is lawfully present and the evidence is clearly incriminating.
State v. Bartlev. 784 P.2d 1231, 1235. Applied to this case, the Court has already established
that Sergeant Mangelson was conducting a valid traffic stop when he detected the odor of
marijuana, which was clearly incriminating. Because these two requirements are met, the
present case is an exception to the warrant requirement. Consequently, the search of the
Defendant's vehicle was proper.

Order
The Defendant's motion is hereby denied.

